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Summary. We study the effect of competition on adverse hospital health outcomes in a context
in which information about hospital quality is not publicly available.We use data on patients who
were admitted to hospitals in the Lombardy region of Italy. Although risk-adjusted hospital rank-
ings are estimated yearly in this region, such rankings are provided to hospital managers only
and are not available to general practitioners or citizens. Hence, patients may choose the hospi-
tal where to be admitted on the basis of different criteria such as their geographical closeness to
the hospital, local network information and referrals by general practitioners. We first estimate a
model of patient hospital choices and include among the determinants a variable capturing so-
cial interaction, which represents a proxy for the quality of hospitals perceived by patients. Using
patient-predicted choice probabilities, we then construct a set of competition indices and mea-
sure their effect on a composite index of mortality and readmission rates that represents, in our
settings, hospital quality in terms of adverse health outcomes. Our results show that no associa-
tion exists between such adverse events and hospital competition. Our finding may be the result
of asymmetric information, as well as the difficulty of building good quality health indicators.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Hospital competition; Multilevel model; Network effect;
Patients’ choice; Quality
1. Introduction
A great debate exists, both at the national and at the international level, on the role of competi-
tion in different sectors of the economy, including the healthcare sector. In recent years, many
governments have introduced competition between healthcare providers to meet the growing
demand for healthcare in a climate of ﬁscal austerity. For example, the last Labour administra-
tion in the UK introduced competition in the form of increased patient freedom to choose a
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healthcare provider with the intent of reaching higher quality without increasing expenditures.
Similarly, at the beginning of the 1990s, some regional governments in Italy (e.g. Lombardy)
implemented healthcare reforms to give patients increased freedom of choice to stimulate com-
petition between hospitals. These interventions originate from a well-known theoretical result
in economics: when prices are ﬁxed and ﬁrms compete, a higher degree of competition is likely
to produce better quality. Economists have gathered empirical evidence on the effects of com-
petition in the healthcare sector, ﬁnding mixed results on the size and direction of these effects
(Gaynor, 2006). Some empirical studies have corroborated the hypothesis that more competi-
tion between hospitals leads to better health outcomes (e.g. Gaynor et al. (2012)) whereas other
studies reject this hypothesis, arguing that more competition may harm people’s health (e.g.
Propper et al. (2004)).
This paper sheds light on why empirical literature often rejects the theoretical result that more
competition leads to better health outcomes in a ﬁxed price setting. For this, we use data from
194020 patients admitted to one of the 126 hospitals in the Lombardy region of Italy in 2012.We
ﬁrst estimate amodel of patient hospital choice. In the Lombardy region, although risk-adjusted
hospital rankings based on different quality and efﬁciency indicators are estimated yearly, such
rankings are provided to hospital managers only and are not available to general practitioners
(GPs) and citizens.
Hence, to adjust for asymmetric information on the quality of hospitals, having taken distance
into account, we include a GP effect, and a local network proxy. We then construct a set of
competition indices and measure their effect on hospital performance in terms of quality. As
quality indicators, we consider outcome variables such as readmission andmortality rateswithin
30 days from discharge (Romano and Mutter, 2004), as well as a composite index of mortality
and readmission rates (Neuman et al., 2014).
Our results show that, after controlling for patient characteristics, the choice of a speciﬁc
hospital seems to depend on the number of people who live in the same area who have previously
chosen the hospital. Further, ceteris paribus, we provide evidence that there is no statistically
signiﬁcant relationshipbetweenhospitals facingmore competitionand their adverse eventhealth
outcomes. Hence, our results indicate that, in the absence of publicly available information
on hospital rankings, there is no association between adverse health outcomes and hospital
competition. One interpretation for this result is that asymmetric information may act as a
barrier for competition to work effectively. A further explanation is the lack of health outcome
indicators that are sufﬁciently able to capture quality.
We explore these issues by implementing an empirical strategy based on two stages. In the ﬁrst
stage we estimate a mixed logit model to investigate the determinants of patient hospital choice.
We then use the predicted probabilities of themixed logit model to compute a set of Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman indices (HHIs) of competition, following the approach by Kessler and McClellan
(2000) to avoid distortion in deﬁning the hospital’s catchment area. In the second stage we esti-
mate a multilevel model to study the effect of hospital competition on adverse health outcomes.
We carry out our analysis at the ward level, using patients who were admitted to three differ-
ent wards—cardiac surgery, cardiology and general medicine. We expect that patients choose
hospitals according to the treatment that they need; hence, they look speciﬁcally at the ward
rather than the hospital as a whole. As noted by Carey and Burgess (1999), page 519,
‘the hospital level of analysis is too general to be capable of revealing variation in quality as measured
by rate-based adverse events’.
This suggests that hospital level health outcomemeasuresmay be too broad to capture the effec-
tiveness that is achieved by different departments operating within the same hospital. Another
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alternative would be to measure hospital quality at the surgical or medical team level. In fact,
patients could choose their provider depending on the national and international reputation of
a particular surgeon or medical team. Although we have no data on surgeon quality, hospital
quality at the ward level may be a good proxy.
We have selected different wards to test the sensitivity of our results when changing wards,
i.e. when moving from a more specialized, high technology ward such as cardiac surgery to a
wider department with a more extensive range of treatments and pathologies such as general
medicine. We would expect patients who need more complicated and risky interventions, such
as heart surgery, to be more conscientious about gathering information on the quality of the
ward when compared with patients who face less complex or life threatening interventions.
Another feature of this paper is that, contrary to previous work, we consider only non-urgent,
or elective, patients in our analysis. The reason for excluding urgent patients is that these patients
need immediate care typically at the closest hospital and in an emergency department. As such,
patients’ choice sets would be very limited and conﬁned to places that are close to where they
live (Tay, 2003) whereas elective patients are less constrained by geographical factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
inﬂuence of competition on health outcomes and discusses the indicator to consider in the rela-
tionship between hospital quality and competition. Section 3 brieﬂy introduces the Lombardy
healthcare system. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 introduces the econometric strategy
and Section 6 presents some descriptive statistics. Section 7 discusses estimation results. Finally,
Section 8 concludes with some suggestions for future research. In Table 1, we report the details
of the variables that are included in the empirical analysis.
2. The influence of competition on health outcomes
Four key factors exist that may shape how competition between hospitals impacts quality:
(a) institutional settings of the hospital market supply side (Kessler and McClellan, 2000;
Tay, 2003; Propper et al., 2004, 2008; Gaynor, 2006; Moscone et al., 2012, Gaynor et al.,
2012),
(b) the degree of patient freedom of choice (Luft et al., 1990; Tay, 2003; Howard, 2005,
Cooper et al., 2011; Beckert et al., 2012; Varkevisser et al., 2012; Moscone et al., 2012),
(c) hospital competitive strategy (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Tay, 2003; Cooper et al.,
2011) and
(d) the degree of information regarding hospital quality (Dranove et al., 2003; Dranove and
Sfekas, 2008).
The ﬁrst factor is related to how competition is implemented in healthcare systems in which
prices are ﬁxed. In some countries, such as the UK, the criteria are dependent on hospital
market performances whereas other countries boost hospital competition by providing patient
information on where to obtain the best treatment. Italy encourages competition by expanding
patient choice sets and offering private hospitals per-treatment public reimbursement funding.
The degree of hospital competition also depends on patients’ freedom of choice of where to
be treated. Some markets have complete freedom (e.g. in the USA)—i.e. patients can choose
any hospital in the relevant market—whereas others have limited freedom (e.g. Italy) either
because patients are free to choose but do not know the hospital quality or because they must
select between a limited number of hospitals. The third factor (hospital competitive strategy)
describes how hospitals compete with other hospitals. In some markets, hospitals can choose
both price and quality (e.g. in the USA), whereas, in others (e.g. in the UK and Italy), prices
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Table 1. List of variable definitions
Variable Deﬁnition
Individual-speciﬁc variables
Choiceij 1 if patient i is admitted to hospital j
Distanceij Time distance from residence of patient i and hospital j (in minutes)
Networki,wj % of residents living in the same municipality as patient i admitted in ward w of
hospital j in the 12 months previous to the analysis
Agei Patient i age in years
Malei 1 if patient i is male
Gpi 100 × the number of patients in the zip code sharing their GP with i/the number of
patients in the zip code
Ward- and hospital-speciﬁc variables
Deathwj Hospital j 30-day mortality rate in ward w
Readmissionwj Hospital j 30-day after discharge readmission rate in ward w
Adverseoutwj Hospital j composite index of adverse health outcomes (i.e. 30-day mortality or
readmission) in ward w
Malewj % of males in ward w of hospital j
Age65wj % of patients over 65 years old in ward w of hospital j
ICUwj % of transits in intensive care unit for patients in ward w of hospital j
DRGWEIwj Average DRG weight in ward w of hospital j
Privatej 1 if hospital j’s ownership is for proﬁt
NFPj 1 if hospital j’s ownership is not for proﬁt
Monoj 1 if hospital j is mono specialized
Teachingj 1 if hospital j is a teaching hospital
Technologyj 1 if the hospital has a high technology assessment (i.e. an intensive care unit
department) and 0 otherwise
Heartwj 1 if ward w in hospital j is cardiac surgery
Cardiowj 1 if ward w in hospital j is cardiology
Medicinewj 1 if ward w in hospital j is general medicine
Bedswj Number of beds in ward w of hospital j
Rankingwj Percentile rank of ward w in hospital j in the league table of the Lombardy quality
evaluation programme
are regulated by a central or local government and they can compete only through quality that
is usually measured in terms of a set of health outcomes. Finally, the degree of competition
depends on the level of hospital information that is available to patients when they choose
where to be admitted. In some markets, like in the USA and the UK, patients are fully in-
formed since hospital rankings are publicly advertised through league tables. See, for instance,
theWeb sites www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html (for theUSA) and
www.chooseandbook.nhs.uk (for the UK). In other countries (Italy), patients are free to
choose but, as they are not privy to hospital rankings, this choice is mainly based on informal
information such as word of mouth, reputation and the media.
Our analysis considers a setting in which hospital competition is quality based and depends
on the number of hospitals that a patient can reach in a reasonable time as well as ﬁxed prices
and asymmetric information regarding the quality of providers. In this context, it is important
to understand the possible effects of hospital competition under different degrees of information
regarding quality that is available to patients.We areworking under the assumption that patients
are rational agents who will maximize their utility if properly informed regarding quality and
that they will choose the hospital that provides the best combination between quality and
geographical distance (or travel time) from their residence. It is reasonable also to assume that,
for more complicated treatment, patients will be willing to travel for a high quality hospital
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and, even for non-complicated treatment, patients also will select a high quality hospital that is
relatively close to their residence and not simply the closest hospital. Under these circumstances,
although top quality hospitals will attract more patients, the intensity of such an effect will
depend on the hospital market structure. For example, if the hospital is a local monopolist,
the effect is negligible since only those who are willing to travel long distances provide the
incremental number of attracted patients. If, on the contrary, the hospital is operating in a
market structure with other hospitals acting as nearby competitors, we can imagine two effects.
The ﬁrst is a short-run effect, whereby the top quality hospital attracts more patients (as limited
by bed capacity), gains market share and is subject to less competition because it enjoys a
quality difference compared with its competitors. This implies that its competition index—e.g.
the HHI—will increase, signalling a decrease in the degree of competition. The second is a
long-term effect whereby competitors will react to the quality gap and (at least those remaining
in the market) will also raise their levels of quality. This implies that, in the long run, market
shares may even be unchanged compared with those existing before the quality gap.
The situation changes completely in the case of asymmetric information. Under this scenario,
patients tend to choose the nearest hospital or base their decision on informal information. The
latter may be based on GP referrals and neighbour assessments. For example, patients may
use information about the decisions of people living in the same area and have or had the
same pathology as those who must make comparable decisions. Friends, relatives or trusted
people who have experienced similar health problems may also act as ﬁlters for the quality
of hospitals, thus shaping individual preferences. However, as also emphasized by Moscone
et al. (2012), interacting and sharing information with neighbours does not necessarily help
in selecting a high quality hospital. For example, the reference group may give importance
to certain attributes such as appearance, comfort and convenience of hospitals (the so-called
amenities; see Goldman and Romley (2010)), which may not necessarily be related to clinical
quality. Patients may be inﬂuenced in their decisions by GPs, who may have better information
and act as agents in a principal (patient)–agent framework (Scott, 2000). GPs may base their
referrals on previous experiences of patients but nevertheless are not completely informed about
true hospital quality in regard to every possible treatment. Under this scenario, high quality
hospitals may fail to attract more patients. Even if institutions have implemented measures to
increase competitionbetweenhospitals, suchmeasuresmaynotobtain the returns from investing
in quality (e.g. hiring the best physicians, buying the most expensive equipment and adopting
costly control procedures in internal operations). Patients have a difﬁcult time recognizing better
quality hospitals and, hence, hospitals may not have an incentive to increase quality. To sum up,
in a situation inwhich asymmetric information exists andprices are ﬁxed, increasing competition
may not produce an effect on health outcomes.
The literature on hospital competition has focused mainly on the US and UK markets.
Although patients are free to choose in both markets, hospitals in the USA may set both prices
(outside Medicare and Medicaid programmes providing health coverage for people over 65
years old, or with a severe disability or with very low income) and quality. In contrast, in
the UK, hospitals can only move quality since prices are regulated. Most studies have investi-
gated the effect of hospital competition on health outcomes as measured by the HHI (Gaynor
and Haas-Wilson, 1999; Dranove and White, 1994; Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Tay, 2003;
Propper et al., 2004, 2008; Gaynor, 2006; Cooper et al., 2011; Moscone et al., 2012; Gaynor
et al., 2012). Recent work, following the approach by Kessler and McClellan (2000), has used
predicted ﬂows based on (exogenous) patient characteristics and patient-to-hospital distance
when computing the HHI, rather than actual patient ﬂows. This allows us to avoid endogene-
ity problems when studying the effect of the HHI on healthcare quality as well as distortions
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in deﬁning the geographical area representing the potential hospital market (Kessler and
McClellan, 2000). The geographical area, if deﬁned by using observed choices, may be in-
ﬂuenced by hospital quality, which leads to larger areas for high quality hospitals, and remains
unobserved by the researchers. The approach by Kessler and McClellan (2000) proposes to use
only exogenous patient characteristics factors affecting patient’s choice that are not linked to
the selection process.
Several studies have investigated the effects of hospital competition on hospital quality in the
US market. Kessler and McClellan (2000) have individual data on non-rural elderly Medicare
patients hospitalized for heart attack treatment in 1985, 1988, 1991 and 1994. They provided
ordinary least squares estimates of the effect of hospital competition and showed that com-
petition leads to better health outcomes, lowering 30-day mortality hospital rates, reducing
treatment costs. Tay (2003) used data from 1994 for patients with acute myocardial infarction
(AMI). She estimated a mixed logit model and showed the importance of quality in patient
choice and provided evidence that they are willing to travel more if the quality of treatment is
higher. Ho and Hamilton (2000) investigated the effects of hospital mergers on mortality rates,
using a data set from patients who were admitted to hospitals in California for AMI treatments
between 1991 and 1996. They estimatedCox regressions and found no effect of increasedmarket
power (through a merger) on mortality rates as well as a moderate effect on readmission and
early discharges rates.
Various studies have analysed the inﬂuence of competition on healthcare quality in the UK.
Propper et al. (2004, 2008) studied hospital mortality rates for AMI and found a negative effect
of competition. They used aggregated hospital level measures and tried to avoid endogeneity
problems in the HHI by estimating potential demand rather than observed choice. Cooper et al.
(2011) implemented a difference-in-differences econometric model to study the effect of recent
UK pro-competition reforms on mortality rates and found that they fell after the reforms in
more competitive hospital markets. In amore recent study, Gaynor et al. (2012) adopted patient
level data for a coronary artery bypass graft procedure and investigated the effect of patients’
freedom of choice on mortality rates. They found that giving patients the possibility of selecting
their hospitals when they know the quality of the hospitals signiﬁcantly reduces mortality rates.
Gaynor et al. (2012) tackled the issue of freedom of choice and information on hospital quality
and the results are very close in spirit to our contribution.
Little empirical work exists on the effect of competition on the healthcare sector in Italy.
Moscone et al. (2012) studied the effect of patient hospital choice of an imperfect measure
of hospital quality (the effect of word-of-mouth social interaction given by the percentage of
patients living in the same area who have previously made the same treatment choice). They
studied the choices of patients suffering from heart disease who were receiving treatment in one
Italian region (Lombardy). Using administrative data that include the whole population, they
showed that the informal neighbourhood effect has no effects on health outcomes and evenmay
lead patients to make suboptimal selections.
Last, only a few references have explored the possible effects of asymmetric information in
healthcare despite the relevant insights that are achieved by some very famous early contribu-
tions (e.g. Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973)) and the massive number of subsequent references
(an excellent review is in Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). Dranove et al. (2003) analysed the effect
of disclosing hospital report cards in the USA and showed that it may induce selection of
patients—i.e. hospitals may not admit patients with bad health statuses because they do not
want to worsen their rankings. Dranove and Sfekas (2008) showed that spreading information
on hospital quality does not necessarily improve the performances of top ranking hospitals,
probably because the rankings conﬁrm patients’ informal perceptions on the different quality
Asymmetric Information, Hospital Competition and Quality of Healthcare 7
levels. Although Varkevisser et al. (2012) provided evidence that patients tend to choose better
quality hospitals in the Netherlands, their study did not show whether this choice produces a
market premium for top quality hospitals. It is important to observe that we expect the prob-
lem of patient selection to have a mild effect in Lombardy. In fact, as explained in Section 3,
hospital managers are unaware of their institutions’ exact rankings unless the institution has a
risk-adjusted health outcome that is signiﬁcantly above, equal to or below the regional average.
Another key factor in the relationship between hospital quality and competition is the choice
of variables representing health outcomes. Several works in the literature use the mortality rate
as the quality indicator (see, among others, Kessler and McClellan (2000), Tay (2003), Propper
et al. (2004, 2008), Beckert et al. (2012) and Cooper et al. (2011)). Although most of these
references focused on treatments for AMI, some researchers (see among others Goldstein and
Spiegelhalter (1996), Iezzoni et al. (1996) and Lilford et al. (2004)) have criticized the use of
mortality in treatments different from AMI as many diseases (e.g. chronic illness) have very low
mortality risks associated. In the USA, there is growing evidence (Neuman et al., 2014) that
mortality rates alone cannot capture hospital differences in treatment provided to patients.
Other references (e.g. Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and Geppert (2005)) have
considered another health outcome indicator: readmission rates. Repeated admissions are in-
cluded in this analysis either as a single indicator in the relationship between hospital quality
and competition or separated by mortality rate (evaluating the previous relationship by using
two dimensions of quality). Readmission ratesmay be a good proxy of hospital quality formany
diseases (e.g. surgical operations) since repeated admissions for the same patient may be a signal
of poor prior treatment. However, in some cases, poor treatment quality may lead to death
without readmission: an event that is considered an adverse health outcome and contributes
to the level of hospital quality. As a result, as suggested by Neuman et al. (2014), a composite
index of mortality and readmission rates may be a better indicator of quality of treatment in a
speciﬁc hospital. The composite index is a proxy for the frequency of adverse health outcomes
that are incurred by patients who are admitted in a speciﬁc ward of a given hospital. This indi-
cator increases the frequency of adverse outcomes (which may also be very low if we focus only
on mortality rates in some wards) and may cover different episodes of bad treatment. Hence,
differently from previous contributions on the relationship between hospital quality and com-
petition, we use a composite index of mortality and readmission rates as a quality indicator in
our empirical application.
3. The Lombardy healthcare system
In Italy, universal coverage for healthcare services is provided by the ItalianNationalHealthcare
System and funded through general taxation. Financial resources are transferred to the various
regions that are in charge of managing their individual systems. In 1992, a major reform of the
National Healthcare System transformed the local health authorities into companies known as
an Azienda Sanitaria Locale (ASL) and introduced a separation between the healthcare service
buyers (the ASL) and the providers (i.e. the hospitals).
Among the Italian regions, Lombardy, with population 10 millon, is a very interesting envi-
ronment in which to study the effects of asymmetric information on hospital competition. In
1997, the regional government implemented pro-competition healthcare reform with the aim
of improving the quality of services in a ﬁnancially sustainable environment. Such reform has
given patients the freedom to choose between all the hospitals in the region. It has also intro-
duced competition between public and private hospitals by allowing the latter to be accredited
as suppliers of healthcare, thus providing free healthcare and public reimbursement entitlement.
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Since 1995, the Lombardy region has used a ﬁnancing mechanism known as the prospective
payment system. This is a ﬁnancing system in which the region pays a predetermined ﬁxed
reimbursement to the hospital for each patient on the basis of his or her diagnosis-related
group (DRG) that is established by using clinical information that is reported in the hospital
discharge chart. The ex post reimbursement for a speciﬁc DRG does not vary if the length of
stay falls within a given threshold. The DRG tariffs are set at the regional level and cover all
healthcare services relative to hospital admissions as well as outpatient activity (see Berta et al.
(2010, 2013) and Vittadini et al. (2012) for further details). Hence, in our analysis, price is not a
strategic variable when dealing with hospital competition. As previously mentioned, we assume
that competition is based on quality and is affected by the present number of hospitals in the
market.
Since 2002, the regional Lombardy government also implemented a quality evaluation pro-
gramme within which a set of indicators is computed every year to evaluate the performance
of healthcare providers in terms of quality of care. In line with the international literature on
the relative effectiveness of hospitals (see, for example, the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (2012)), these measures include the following ﬁve outcomes:
(a) mortality within 30 days from discharge (including intrahospital mortality);
(b) discharges against medical advice;
(c) additional surgery room readmission;
(d) readmission for the same condition in the major diagnostic categories within 12 months
from the date of discharge;
(e) transfer to a different hospital.
We have decided to focus on mortality and readmission (by using a composite index) as patient
transfer and voluntary discharge may depend on factors that are unrelated to treatment and ad-
ditional surgery may be relevant for speciﬁc treatments only. Lastly, we do not have information
on intrahospital infections and complications.
Using data from hospital discharge charts, the region estimates a set of risk-adjusted mul-
tilevel logistic models to evaluate the relative effectiveness of each hospital ward. This class of
models exploits the hierarchical structure of the data, accounting for heterogeneity between and
within hospitals (see Hox (1995), Goldstein (1995), Rice and Leyland (1996) and Goldstein and
Spiegelhalter (1996)). Every year, the region publishes the results on aWeb portal in which only
hospitals that are included in the regional healthcare system can log in, access their performance
results (at ward level) and compare the results with the average performance. For each ward the
region provides a hospital classiﬁcation into three groups depending on whether the quality is
signiﬁcantly (at 5% conﬁdence level) above the regional average (group 1), not different (group
2) or signiﬁcantly below the regional average (group 3). By allowing hospitals to look at their
own performance relative to others, the aim is to promote an improvement in health quality.
4. Data
We gathered administrative data from 2012 on all patients who were admitted to the cardiac
surgery, cardiologyandgeneralmedicinewards inanypublic orprivatehospital in theLombardy
region that was ﬁnanced by regional public funds. The Lombardy region provided data for
research purposes.
Data on each patient were extracted from the hospital discharge chart and include socio-
demographic characteristics such as age, gender and place of residence (the municipality), clin-
ical information such as principal diagnosis and codiagnosis, main and secondary procedures,
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comorbidity, length of stay, type of admission (planned or via the emergency room) the ward of
admission and type of discharge (e.g. death), ﬁnancial information such as the DRG and hos-
pital discharge chart reimbursement. Such data were matched with information on hospitals
(ownership and teaching status, technology, etc.), and on the travel distance in minutes from the
patient’s residence (the municipality) to the hospital. Information on travel distance, expressed
in units of time, was computed by using GoogleMaps. The algorithm computes the fastest route
from an individual’s residence to the hospital by car. The distance is set to 0 if an individual’s
street address and the hospital location are identical.
We also gathered information on theGPs with whom patients are registered from theGeneral
Register Ofﬁce, which was provided by the Lombardy region and represents the 7605 GPs
operating in the region.
We removed from the data set any patient whose source of admission was other than elective.
We deﬁne as elective all booked or planned admissions in which patients have been given a
date or approximate date at the time that the decision to admit was made. After this cleaning
procedure, we are left with a total of 194020 patients of whom 9121 were admitted to cardiac
surgery, 71499 to cardiology and 113400 to general medicine. These patients were admitted to
the cardiac surgery ward of 20 hospitals, the cardiology ward of 76 hospitals and to the general
medicine ward of 124 hospitals in the Lombardy region.
Table 1 reports a list of variables and their deﬁnitions. We observe that, in the computation
of readmission rates, patients not surviving past the 30-day window were excluded from the
denominator.
5. The econometric strategy
To study the effect of competition between hospitals on health outcomes we adopt a two-
stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage we study patient hospital choices as a function of a set of
patient characteristics, the hospital travel distance and the network effect. In the second stage,
we compute a set of HHIs (one for each ward and for each hospital) by using the predicted
choice probabilities estimated in the ﬁrst stage and then analyse their effect on hospital quality.
As previously mentioned, we focus on a composite index of mortality and readmission rates,
namely ward level rates of mortality and readmission within 30 days from discharge.
In the ﬁrst stage, we investigate patient choices by using a discrete choice model. Patients
maximize their utility functions given their characteristics and hospital travel distance. Given
that information on the quality of hospitals is not publicly available, we assume that information
regarding the quality of past treatment received at a speciﬁc hospital is transmitted through
social interaction among the population living in the same neighbourhood. As patients within
a neighbourhood interact, the choice of one patient is inﬂuenced by the choice of neighbouring
patients (BrockandDourlaf, 2001). Suppose that, forwardw, the observable choice of individual
i of being admitted to hospital j, yi,wj, is related to the expected utility of i choosing j, yÅi,wj,
according to yi,wj =1 if yÅi,wj >0. Our choice model is
yÅi,wj =ρwdi,wj + δwjNetworki,wj +γwjGPi +π′wjxi + "i,wj, .1/
where dij is the distance between patient i and hospital j, GPi is the percentage of patients living
in the zip codeaspatient iand sharing theirGPwithpatient iandxi are a set of exogenous, patient
level characteristics. As for the distance variable, we have taken the travel distance expressed in
minutes. The variable Networki,wj is a continuous variable given by the share of people living
in the same municipality as patient i and admitted to ward w of the same hospital j, in the
10 P. Berta, G. Martini, F. Moscone and G. Vittadini
12 months before patient i’s admission. In the Lombardy region, like in the rest of Italy, most of
the population is concentrated in small-to-medium sizedmunicipalities that are characterized by
a strong historical and cultural identity as well as autonomy guaranteed by the Italian legislative
structure. Family members usually live within the same municipality and meeting with friends
and relatives is encouraged through local associations, cultural events, activities of the local
parishes and so forth. Within the same municipality, historical, political, social and religious
forces may encourage interaction between people, which is the main reason for using it as a
reference area for building the network variable.
A positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient attached to the network effect and relative to hospital j
means that a subset of the population, sharing informal information on the quality of the jth
hospital, increases the conditional probability of choosing it for each member of this subset. A
negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient implies that, ceteris paribus, a patient will make a choice that
is different from that of her neighbours. The key mechanism underlying a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
attached to the jth hospital, either positive or negative, is the existence of clusters of informal
information on the quality of the jth hospital. Such information, which we call a network effect,
shapes the preferences of individuals and ultimately inﬂuences their decisions. A statistically
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient means that patients do not use information from the network to choose
that hospital and hence their choice is driven only by personal characteristics.
In equation (1) vector x of patient characteristics includes as regressors a dummy equal to 1
if patient i is over 65 years old, Agei, and a dummy equal to 1 if patient i is male, Malei. We also
include a variable measuring the fraction of patients in the postal code area of patient i sharing
a GP with patient i, GPi. By including this variable, we aim to capture the potential correlation
that arises from GP advice on the hospital at which to be treated. We estimate equation (1)
for each ward separately by maximum likelihood using a mixed logit approach (Tay, 2003;
Varkevisser et al., 2012). To estimate our model, we have applied the asclogit procedure in
the statistical software Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013).
We then calculate the HHI of competition by computing the theoretical patient ﬂows by
using the predicted choice probabilities that are obtained from the ﬁrst stage. This is done
to avoid potential endogeneity in patient ﬂows and in deﬁning hospital catchment areas as
underlined by Kessler and McClellan (2000). In fact, real patient ﬂows can be inﬂuenced by
variables such as the teaching status or the size of a hospital, which are connected with health
outcomes and hospital quality. The endogeneity problem may also arise because hospitals with
higher quality could obtain higher market shares and thus the index of competition may be
affected by the dependent variable. Such endogeneity may bias results when regressing the
HHI on health outcomes. Moreover, deﬁning hospital geographic markets as a function of
actual choices may lead to areas that are increasing in the unobservable quality. This has an
inﬂuence on the HHIs and may give rise to competition effect estimates on hospital outcomes
that are due both to the true effect and to the unobservable quality. As indicated by Kessler
and McClellan (2000), building theoretical patients based on exogenous factors may overcome
these problems. Hence, in our empirical application we compute the HHI indices for each ward
or hospital with a three-stage approach: ﬁrst, we estimate patient level hospital choice as a
function of exogenous determinants of the admission decision (e.g. age and distance). This
produces predicted probabilities of admission for each patient in each ward or hospital of the
relevant geographical area. Summing these predicted probabilities at the ward or hospital level
gives the predicted ﬂow of patients who are admitted to each ward or hospital in the sample on
the basis of exogenous characteristics of patients and hospitals. Second, we compute the HHI
by using the exogenously determined patient ﬂows that are assigned to each ward or hospital.
Third, in the quality–competition relationship, we insert this HHI as a regressor.
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Previous literature deﬁnes potentialmarkets of hospital-speciﬁcHHIs as the area surrounding
each hospital by using an array of arbitrary lengths—e.g. 30 km (Bloom et al., 2010; Siciliani and
Martin, 2007). To avoid the possible biases in computing theHHIby using these ad hocmethods,
we followKessler andMcClellan (2000) anduse thepredictedﬂows that are estimatedwithmodel
(1) to compute HHI indices by exogenously assigning each patient to a given geographic area
identiﬁed by the local healthcare zone, called the ASL (local health authority). In Lombardy,
there are 15 ASLs and each patient is exogenously assigned to one. Let πˆi,wj be the predicted
probability that patient i chooses hospital j (in ward w/, obtained from equation (1). The share
of patients living in ASL area q who are predicted to choose hospital j over the predicted ﬂow
of patients living in ASL q to all the hospitals is
αq,wj =
∑






∀ i living in q
πˆi,wj, .2/
where J is the number of hospitals operating within a given ward (e.g. cardiology) in Lombardy.
Expression (2) is computed for each hospital in Lombardy and for eachward that are considered















where Nwj is the total number of patients admitted in ward w of hospital j in Lombardy. The





Hence, eachward–hospital has anHHI competition index that is a weighted average (using each
hospital patient share in ASL q/ of the exogenously deﬁned ASL q competition index. HHIwj
varies between 10000 × 1/J (competition) and 10000 (monopoly), with larger values indicating
a decrease in the degree of competition.
The second stage of our econometric approach is designed to verify the inﬂuence of com-
petition on hospital adverse health outcomes. Let ywj be the adverse health outcome (either
mortality or readmission) for ward w of hospital j. In our second stage we consider the follow-







γmzm,j +θHHIwj +uj + "wj, .6/
where xk,wj is a set of ward and hospital-speciﬁc characteristics zmj is a set of hospital-speciﬁc
attributes and uj is a hospital-speciﬁc random effect. We consider, as adverse health outcomes
ywj, the (ward-speciﬁc) 30-day mortality rate Deathwj and the readmission rate Readmissionwj
in hospital j. We consider also an adverse outcome index given by the combination of read-
mission and mortality. As regressors, in addition to the HHI, our key variable, we control also
for some other variables. We include the percentage of patients who are older than 65 years to
account for patient health status given that age is highly correlated with chronic conditions. We
have also included theward or hospital averageDRGweightDRGwj, identiﬁcation of treatment
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complexity and the percentage of patients receiving treatment in the intensive care unit, ICUwj.
Further, we have included dummies indicating whether the hospital specializes in a particular
area of treatment, Monoj, is a university, Teachingj, a not-for-proﬁt, NFPi, or a private hospi-
tal, Privatej, and whether the hospital uses advanced technology for patient treatment, Techj.
Since we do not have information on speciﬁc technological equipment, we adopt the presence
in hospital i of an intensive care unit as proxy for hospital classiﬁcation. Although this feature
ﬁts well in the case of general medicine and cardiology, for heart surgery we identify a set of
treatments that require high technology equipment such as
(a) repair of atrial and ventricular septa with prostheses,
(b) total repair of certain congenital cardiac anomalies and
(c) heart replacement procedures.
We include ward dummies Heartwj and Cardiowj and an interaction term identifying the
effect of the HHI for not-for-proﬁt and private hospitals only. This is to include the interward
variability in the relation adverse outcomes–competition. Lastly, we take into account also that
some choices are repeated in our patient level data. In other words, a patient making a second
hospital choice for the same treatment is more informed than when the patient made the ﬁrst
decision. Hence, we include in the analysis the percentage of repeated choices (made by the same
patient) that are different from the ﬁrst choice at the hospital level. This variable identiﬁes a
share of patients who were admitted for the ﬁrst time in hospital i who did not repeat the same
choice later—i.e. a possible signal of poor treatment in hospital i. This may explain the level of
adverse health outcomes in hospital i. The average percentage of these choices is 4% in cardiac
surgery, 8.4% in cardiology and 8.1% in general medicine. However, as this percentage was not
statistically signiﬁcant, we dropped it from our empirical results.
We estimate multilevel model (6) (Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996; Leyland and Goldstein,
2001) by applying the Mixed procedure in Stata. Multilevel models are very suitable for our
application given the hierarchical structure of data in which patients are nested within wards
and hospitals. Various alternative techniques have been proposed in the literature to estimate
multilevel equation (6). One important approach is the use of Bayesian methods for hierarchi-
cal models that estimate posterior distributions for provider-speciﬁc parameters that inﬂuence
patient outcomes (see, among others, McClellan and Staiger (1999)). The comparison of multi-
level and Bayesian models when data have a hierarchical structure has not been widely studied.
Browne and Draper (2006) performed several comparisons and found a better performance by
using a Bayesian estimator only in a three-level, random-effects logistic regression. Our analysis
concerns a large sample and, as also observed in the conclusion of Browne et al. (2006), the log-
likelihood approach should not give rise to concerns of lower performance than the Bayesian
approaches.
The main focus in this second stage is on the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the parameter
attached to the HHI. A positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient indicates that more competition
increases the level of quality that is offered by hospitals, whereas a coefﬁcient that is statistically
insigniﬁcant would point to no effect of competition.
In this last stage, as a ﬁnal check, we also test whether there is a relationship between the
regional risk-adjusted, hospital quality ranking and patient-predicted choices. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate the following multilevel model by using data at the patient level:
πˆi,wj =α+βRankingwj +γBedswj +Heartwj +Cardiowj +uj + "i,wj, .7/
where πˆi,wj is patient i’s maximum probability among all her predicted probabilities (obtained
from equation (1)) of selecting each hospital in the region with ward w, and Rankingwj is
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the hospital level ranking calculated by the Lombardy region within the quality evaluation
programme. Bedswj is the number of beds for each ward and Heartj and Cardioj are ward
ﬁxed effects to control for hospital-speciﬁc characteristics. An insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient for the
ranking variable indicates that actual levels of quality do not drive patients’ choice of hospital.
We observe that, as emphasized by Austin et al. (2015), hospital quality as measured by ranking
may offer a poor representation of the true level of hospital quality.
6. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 summarizes the set of patient-speciﬁc characteristics that are included in our analysis.
Table 3 displays some descriptive statistics for the hospital-speciﬁc variables.
The statistics show that cardiac pathology affects more males than females and that patients
in cardiology and general medicine are older than patients in cardiac surgery. Looking at the
distance variables, we note that patients who are admitted to cardiac surgery are more willing
to travel longer distances and that their network size is smaller compared with cardiology and
general medicine patients.
Focusing on theward and hospital level variables, we note that generalmedicine has highmor-
tality rates. As expected, patients who are admitted to cardiac surgery are (relatively) young and
are undergoing highly specialized expensive treatment and interventions. Conversely, patients
who are admitted to cardiology and general medicine are older, often affected by a number of
comorbidities, and admitted for a variety of treatments and interventions.
Table 3 shows also that the three wards have different compositions in terms of ownership and
teaching status. Private and teaching hospitals often have cardiac surgery wards, whereas public,
non-teaching hospitals often have cardiology and general medicine wards. Also, as expected,
cardiac surgery wards have high technology equipment.
Table 4offers a set of descriptive statistics onpatient-to-hospital distance,measured inminutes
of time, for the three wards. It is interesting to observe that the average distance to the cardiology
ward is much shorter than for the cardiac surgery ward: about 19 min for the former versus 29
min for the latter. This may be explained by the fact that patients who are admitted for cardiac
surgery may face more complex interventions and thus are more willing to travel further to
receive high quality treatment. Table 4 shows that, overall, patients tend to choose nearby
hospitals, showing little propensity to travel for hospital treatments in a context of asymmetric
information regarding hospital quality in Lombardy.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on individual-specific variables
Variable Results for Results for Results for
cardiac surgery cardiology general medicine
Average Standard Average Standard Average Standard
deviation deviation deviation
Distanceij 29.18 20.72 19.10 15.72 15.87 13.02
Networki,wj 38.01 29.77 66.10 33.59 77.86 29.15
Agei 64.78 17.11 69.34 13.82 72.91 15.68
Malei .%/ 65.52 47.50 64.78 47.77 49.56 50.00
GPi 14.11 17.85 14.23 18.02 18.27 20.54
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics on ward- and hospital-specific variables
Variable Results for Results for cardiology Results for







Deathwj .%/ 1.03 1.07 2.23 1.83 12.82 5.28
Readmissionwj .%/ 4.43 1.30 5.13 1.8 4.94 2.45
Death+Readmissionwj .%/ 5.31 1.62 7.25 2.54 17.12 5.60
Malewj .%/ 66.71 4.74 63.08 6.76 48.32 6.45
Age65wj .%/ 64.51 7.68 70.76 8.13 77.05 8.39
ICUwj .%/ 76.38 42.47 20.77 40.57 1.55 12.36
DRGWEIwj 5.10 2.86 1.67 1.07 1.07 0.71
NFPj .%/ 10.00 30.77 10.52 30.89 12.10 32.61
Privatej .%/ 40.00 50.26 26.31 44.37 13.59 34.26
Technologyj .%/ 95.00 22.00 92.10 27.14 74.57 43.55
Teachingj (%) 40.00 50.26 15.71 36.72 17.81 38.26
Monoj (%) 5.0 22.36 1.31 11.47 0.91 9.48
Bedswj 21.12 14.83 22.50 16.44 43.87 31.39
Rankingwj (rank) 49.45 29.46 53.13 28.21 49.18 27.54
Number of hospitals 20 76 124
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on patient-to-hospital time distance by ward
Ward Minimum 25th percentile Average Median 75th percentile Maximum
(min) (min) (min) (min) (min) (min)
Cardiac surgery 0 16 29.18 24 38 152
Cardiology 0 10 19.10 16 24 188
General medicine 0 7 15.87 13 20 197
7. Estimation results
Table 5 summarizes results for the estimation of patient hospital choice. It reports a set of
statistics on regression coefﬁcients estimated by maximum likelihood. Although for brevity we
do not show all hospital-speciﬁc coefﬁcients, we provide information on their distribution.
As expected, patient-to-hospital travel distance has a negative signiﬁcant inﬂuence on choices,
implying that patients are more likely to choose closer hospitals relative to similar alternatives
at longer distances (Sivey, 2012). The coefﬁcient that is attached to GPi is positive, though with
mild effect and weak evidence.
Looking at the results for the network variable, it is interesting to observe that the estimated
coefﬁcients are large and the average t-ratio is statistically signiﬁcant in all models, thus indicat-
ing neighbourhood effects. For cardiac surgery, the average coefﬁcient is higher than for other
wards, indicating that patients, ceteris paribus, are strongly inﬂuenced by the choice of their
neighbours. However, we remark that we do not have enough information to understand the
mechanism underlying this network effect. We observe that patients who are admitted to this
ward often need complicated and risky interventions and may spend more time and effort on
gathering information on the quality of the ward when compared with other patients.
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Table 5. Determinants of patient hospital choices
Independent variable Results for dependent variable choice and the following wards:
Cardiac surgery Cardiology General medicine
Coefﬁcient Standard Coefﬁcient Standard Coefﬁcient Standard
error error error
Distanceij −0:100† 0.001 −0:160† 0.001 −0:171† 0.001
Hospital’s random coefﬁcients (base = code 030106)
Networki,wj
Mean 5.732 4.024 1.036
Standard deviation 3.701 11.556 3.786
Minimum −2:407 −6:579 −6:053
Maximum 11.854 58.730 16.460
Mean standard error 0.516 0.522 0.259
Mean absolute values of t-ratios 12.095 10.961 7.457
Agei
Mean 0.001 0.024 0.021
Standard deviation 0.028 0.032 0.025
Minimum −0:050 −0:040 −0:042
Maximum 0.080 0.124 0.092
Mean standard error 0.007 0.007 0.005
Mean absolute values of t-ratios 2.742 3.881 4.820
Malei
Mean −0:094 −0:064 0.012
Standard deviation 0.489 0.385 0.296
Minimum −0:600 −1:122 −1:067
Maximum 1.577 1.936 0.814
Mean standard error 0.199 0.188 0.152
Mean absolute values of t-ratios 1.674 1.261 1.621
GPi
Mean 0.003 −0:001 −0:002
Standard deviation 0.013 0.019 0.013
Minimum −0:030 −0:054 −0:063
Maximum 0.022 0.039 0.023
Mean standard error 0.006 0.006 0.005
Mean absolute values of t-ratios 1.805 2.300 2.187
Constant
Mean 1,730 −5:931 −3:316
Standard deviation 2.717 11.888 4.061
Minimum −8:441 −67:110 −19:830
Maximum 4.937 5.455 4.586
Mean standard error 0.516 0.720 0.336
Mean absolute values of t-ratios 4.728 7.840 6.648
Observations 172280 4601876 12700700
Bayesian information criterion 29003.2 228815.3 370129.8
†1% statistical signiﬁcance.
We have performed some robustness checks. First, we tried to estimate the choice model by
changing the deﬁnition of the network variable (see the deﬁnition in Table 1). In particular, we
have estimated equation (1) by measuring the network variable lagged 6 and 24 months before
admission as an alternative to the 12-month measure. Results are robust against different lags
of the network variable. As an additional check, we also compared these results with those
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics on computed HHIs in the three wards
Ward Mean Minimum 25th Median 75th Maximum
(standard percentile percentile
deviation)
Cardiac 2323.27 1438.92 1641.56 2007.57 2532.19 6480.12
surgery (1140.86) Ca’ Granda Niguarda C. Poma Mantua
Cardiology 1319.98 564.94 875.74 1201.26 1538.25 3739.27
(630.86) Fatebenefratelli Milan Valcamonica Esine
General 1041.85 550.50 642.11 949.65 1115.02 5238.45
medicine (601.20) San Pellegrino Terme Valcamonica Esine
obtained by multinomial and conditional logit model approaches. The results are very similar
and therefore not reported.
We note that the coefﬁcients that are attached to the network variable might not only reﬂect
social inﬂuences but also the effect of other factors. In particular, such interdependence may
arise because of contextual effects, i.e. if individual action varies with observed attributes that
deﬁnes her group membership—or correlated effects—and if individuals in the same group
tend to behave similarly because they have similar characteristics or similar opportunities and
constraints (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). In addition, our data do not allow us
to know whether patients, when choosing a hospital, use sources of information other than
the local network such as advice from a specialist or forum groups on the Web. Such external
sources may have an inﬂuence on the network effect and reduce its size.
Table 6 shows the distribution of the HHIs calculated for the three wards and computed by
using theoretical patient ﬂows. The average, median, 25th and 75th percentiles of the HHI are
consistently higher for heart surgery, indicating a lower degree of competition compared with
cardiology and general medicine. It is interesting that we obtain the largest HHIs for hospitals
that are quasi-local monopolists—in rural areas or very small cities—whereas the lowest HHI
values are attached to hospitals in the densely populated areas of Milan and Bergamo.
Table 7 shows the estimation results for equation (6), highlighting the inﬂuence of competition
on hospital quality measured by adverse health outcomes after controlling for various sets of
regressors. In all speciﬁcations, the estimated coefﬁcient attached to the HHI is statistically
insigniﬁcant. The interaction term between the HHI and ownership status is also insigniﬁcant,
indicating that there are no signiﬁcant differences regarding the effect of competition on adverse
outcomes for public, private and not-for-proﬁt hospitals. Given the relatively small sample size
when estimating equation (6), we ran a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of our results.
After checking for the variance–covariancematrix of residuals andobtaining the standard errors
bybootstrappingmethods,we achieved robust estimates.We computed the standard error power
for the HHI coefﬁcient by following the approach that was proposed by Snijders (2005). The
power is 0.7, which is considered satisfactory (Cohen, 1988).
As for the remaining regressors, the dummy variable for heart surgery has a negative and
(weakly) signiﬁcant coefﬁcient attached in model 1, suggesting that the likelihood of adverse
outcomes for patients in this ward is relatively lower than for patients in general medicine. The
estimated coefﬁcient attached to Age65wj is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all models,
indicating that hospitals with a higher share of patients who are older than 65 years tend to have
more adverse health outcomes. High technology hospitals have more adverse outcomes than
non-high-technology hospitals. This result may be explained by the fact that high technology
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Table 7. Effect of competition on hospital health outcomes†
Independent Results for dependent variable hospital composite index of
variable adverse health outcomes and the following models:
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
(standard error) (standard error) (standard error)
HHIwj 0.031 (0.051) 0.013 (0.039) 0.018 (0.056)
Age65wj 0.193 (0.047)‡ 0.212 (0.048)‡ 0.215 (0.055)‡
Genderwj −0:111 .0:090/ −0:046 .0:104/ −0:046 .0:105/
Drgwj 0.006 (0.018) 0.006 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014)
ICUwj −0:009 .0:026/ −0:037 .0:029/ −0:037 .0:031/
Techj 0.022 (0.008)‡ 0.022 (0.010)§
Monoj −0:005 .0:020/ −0:005 .0:022/
Teachingj −0:004 .0:008/ −0:002 .0:008/
NFPj −0:026 .0:013/§ −0:014 .0:038/
Privatej −0:013 .0:007/§§ −0:017 .0:017/
Hearthwj −0:137 .0:072/§§ −0:105 .0:064/ −0:109 .0:062/§§
Cardiowj −0:106 .0:014/‡ −0:095 .0:016/‡ −0:096 .0:020/‡
HHIjÅNFPj −0:110 .0:274/
HHIjÅPrivatej 0.034 (0.134)
Constant 0.069 (0.050) 0.016 (0.043) 0.013 (0.056)
Number of observations 220 220 220
Log-likelihood 382.51 391.82 392.19
ICC 0.065 0.066 0.075
†Results show estimates of multilevel model (6) by pseudolikelihood techniques by maxi-




hospitals generally alsohave an intensive care unit. There isweak statistically signiﬁcant evidence
in model 2 that private hospitals have lower adverse outcome rates than public hospitals.
The absence of evidence of a relationship between quality and competition may be explained
by the presence of asymmetric information about the ‘true’ quality of hospitals, which was also
suggested by Moscone et al. (2012). In fact, the presence of asymmetric information may act
as a barrier for competition to work effectively, since it may reduce the possible returns from
investing in hospital quality. A complementary explanation, of lack of such evidence, is the
difﬁculty of using health outcomes that are sufﬁciently sensitive to detect differences in ward
level quality as discussed at the end of Section 2.
Table 8 reports results for the estimation of the effect of hospital quality ranking on patient-
predicted choice probabilities obtained from the threewards in stage 1. It is interesting that the ef-
fect of hospital rankings on predicted probabilities is always statistically insigniﬁcant. This result
reinforces the role that is played by the presence of asymmetric information on elective patients.
8. Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigated how competition affects the health of patients in quasi-healthcare
in the Lombardy regional market. We found that more competition does not seem to have a
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Table 8. Impact of hospital quality ranking on patient-predicted choice
probabilities†
Independent Results for dependent variable patient-predicted







Number of observations 171616
ICC 0.67
†Results showestimates ofmultilevelmodel (6) by pseudolikelihood techniques
by maximum likelihood.
‡1% signiﬁcance.
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the quality of hospitals. One explanation for this result is a lack of pub-
licly available information on the quality of hospitals. The presence of such asymmetric informa-
tionmay exacerbate the inﬂuence of information that is gathered locally. Itmay also result in a re-
duced freedomof choice for patients, a lower degree of competition between hospitals and a lack
of market premium for top quality hospitals. Our results point to the network effect as a barrier
for competition to work effectively and indicate that patient choice is likely to be not affected by
the true quality of hospitals. Our analysismay shed light onwhy empirical literature often rejects
the theoretical result that more competition should lead to better health when prices are ﬁxed.
Our contribution has two important policy implications. First, the results show that it is
necessary and urgent to disclose information regarding hospital quality ranking computed
within the regional quality evaluation programme, to GPs, patients and the wider public. As
shown by Austin et al. (2015), a set of indicators delivered to the public must remain ﬁxed for a
sufﬁciently long period of time to avoidmisunderstandings and confusion.As such, the presence
of asymmetric informationwill be reduced andpatientswill tend to choose highquality hospitals
and to enjoy the beneﬁts of having invested in better healthcare. Although publicly available
hospital rankingsmay certainly support patient choice and encourage providers to improve their
quality, this may not be enough to encourage low quality hospitals to improve their quality of
care.Hence, our second policy implication is that the regional government shouldmake a special
intervention on behalf of these hospitals. For instance, such an intervention may give hospitals
with only one or two wards, which is signiﬁcantly below the regional average (i.e. indicated as
belonging to group 3within the quality evaluation programme), a time period—say, 1–2 years—
within which theymustmake improvements. If a ward is still ranked in the bottom quality group
after this period of time, it would be closed or receive a monetary penalty. These interventions
in the regional hospital structure are essential to form a competitive hospital market.
Our results are open to further new research developments. In this paper, following Moscone
et al. (2012), we have used hospital network effects as a proxy for patient sensitivity to local
information or social interaction. However, we observe that social interaction may be the result
of other forces such as contextual or correlated effects (Manski, 1993; Brock andDurlauf, 2001).
Future work will consider strategies for disentangling social interaction from the effect of other
factors. A limitation of our work is that the study focuses on only a single cross-section. Future
Asymmetric Information, Hospital Competition and Quality of Healthcare 19
work will explore whether our results are consistent when using panel data. Another interesting
extension is the analysis of healthcare quality at the surgical or team level or using the average
surgical quality within the ward weighted by the number of surgeries. In fact, patients could
choose their provider depending on the national and international reputation of a particular
surgeon or medical team and average surgical quality is a more accurate measure of quality.
Finally, we remark that the indicators that are usually used in the literature are not sufﬁciently
sensitive to detect variations in ward level quality. Although in our paper we have mitigated this
issue by using a composite index of adverse health outcomes, future work should include other
indicators for hospital quality—e.g. clinical indicators describing the quality of the treatment
that is used in variouspathological conditions (Iezzoni et al., 1996;Damberg et al., 1998), process
measures such as the frequency of using best practices in the treatment of a pathology (Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization, 1994), sentinel events representing
unexpectedoccurrences (e.g. deathor severe physical or psychological injury) (JointCommission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization, 1994) and quality-of-life outcomes indicating the
general health condition of the patient (Damberg et al., 1998).
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